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Complex Litigation in New Jersey and Federal
Courts: An Overview of the Current State of Affairs
and a Glimpse of What Lies Ahead
Hon. Brian R. Martinotti, J.S.C.*
INTRODUCTION
Complex, or aggregate, litigation arises in a variety of contexts,
including class actions, 1 mass torts, 2 cases assigned for centralized
* Judge Brian R. Martinotti was appointed to the Superior Court of New Jersey in February of
2002. Since March 2006, he has served in the Civil Division and was the Environmental and Mt.
Laurel Judge until August 2011. In August 2009, the Chief Justice designated him as one of the
State’s three mass tort judges. Prior to this appointment, Judge Martinotti, a Certified Civil Trial
Attorney, was a partner at Beattie Padovano, LLC, located in Montvale, New Jersey. He
graduated from Fordham University in 1983 and Seton Hall Law School, cum laude, in 1986.
I would like to acknowledge and thank Philip W. Danziger, Esq., for his invaluable
contributions to this Essay. Mr. Danziger served as my mass tort law clerk from 2011–2012 and
was assigned primary responsibility for managing the multicounty litigations and centrally
managed cases over which I preside. I owe him a great deal of gratitude for all his hard work,
research, proofing, and rewriting for this Essay. He graciously (and promptly) responded to my
4:30 a.m. e-mails, and his ability to read my mind and know where I am going is only
overshadowed by his ability to read my handwriting. Mr. Danziger consistently exceeded my
expectations—and his job description—and I wish him nothing but the best as he embarks on
what will be a very successful legal career. Finally, I would like to thank Jennifer Lahm, Mr.
Danziger’s successor as my multicounty litigation law clerk, for assisting with the final edits of
this Essay and for continuing Mr. Danziger’s high quality of work.
1. Class action lawsuits are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
federal courts, and New Jersey Court Rule 4:32 in New Jersey state courts. While class actions
have a long history in the federal courts, their use was greatly enhanced by the 1966 amendment
of Rule 23. Before this amendment, class actions had usually involved antitrust, securities, pricefixing, and Fair Labor Standards Act cases. The use of class actions for mass torts was neither
intended nor expected by the framers of amended Rule 23, who assumed that common issues of
fact and law would be outweighed by differences in the circumstances of the injuries, the injuries
themselves, and in state laws. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s notes.
Nevertheless, class actions have become an effective way of challenging systematic
discrimination or company-wide misconduct. Plaintiffs in class actions can craft remedies and
injunctive relief far greater in scope than in an individual case. Class actions also put others on
notice of potential deceptive practices of which they may not have been aware. Moreover, the
class action enables individuals to pool their resources, share litigation risks and burdens, and
more easily retain counsel for small value claims. Finally, the class action mechanism provides
an efficient means of resolving similar claims in one lawsuit—relieving the courts of repetitive
individual litigation and providing defendants with global peace. In sum, the class action lawsuit
plays an important and unique role in the civil justice system. See generally DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN
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management, 3 and multidistrict litigation (“MDL”). 4 This Essay
provides a brief overview of the various processes and management
techniques of these complex cases5 in the New Jersey and federal court
systems. 6 This Essay also comments on the impact of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent decisions in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 7 and AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion8 on the mass tort process. Lastly, this
Essay addresses case management techniques in mass tort matters and
the tools available to trial judges assigned to oversee such cases. 9

(2000) (describing the pros and cons of class action lawsuits).
2. Mass torts may be distinguished from other personal injury claims in that mass torts involve
large numbers of claims that are associated with a single product, property damage, or location.
Despite the number of claimants, there must be a commonality of factual and legal issues, as well
as a value interdependence between the different claims. See N.J. CT. R. 4:38-1(a). See also
infra note 5 and accompanying text (noting that the term “mass tort” refers to complex litigation
generally). Under Rule 4:38A (effective September 4, 2012), the Supreme Court removed the
“mass tort” term altogether. Now, these cases will be referred to as “multicounty litigation,” or
MCL. The term “mass tort,” however, continues to be used nationwide and can be used
interchangeably with “multicounty litigation.”
3. Precipitating the recent amendment to Rule 4:38A was a shift in the nomenclature used to
describe a centralized litigation, from “mass tort” to “centralized management.” This change in
description can be seen as a minor benefit to defendants, as the term “mass tort” has proved
somewhat inertial in driving up the number of cases filed following centralization under Rule
4:38A. There may also be public relations concerns for large, corporate defendants. The
practical impact of the different terminology, however, remains the same. Once consolidated,
designated litigations operate as a sort of “mini-MDL,” drawing plaintiffs from New Jersey and
other states (or even other countries) who seek to take advantage of New Jersey rules and
procedure.
4. Multidistrict litigation arises when civil litigation involving one or more common questions
of fact is pending in different districts and such actions are transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006). Such transfers are
made by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”). A judge (or judges) to whom
such actions are assigned by the JPML conduct these coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings. The judge to whom such actions are assigned, the members of the JPML, and other
circuit and district judges designated by the JPML may exercise the powers of a district judge in
any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings. Id. § 1407(b).
5. Unless otherwise specified, hereinafter “mass tort” shall be used to refer to complex
litigation, generally. This includes cases that have been assigned mass tort status or have been
designated for centralized management, as well as those cases that have been consolidated before
a single judge for pretrial and trial management to ensure consistent results but without the
attendant formalities of being a “mass tort.”
6. Although this Essay is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the mass tort
designation process, it should be mentioned that many states have established formal procedures
for applying for mass tort status. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3.400 (West 2007); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 42; PA. CT. C.P.R. 1701-1717; N.Y C.P.L.R. 202.69 (CONSOL. 2012). For further
commentary on various states’ procedures, see DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION FOURTH (2011 ed.).
7. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
8. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
9. More specifically, this Essay is a summary of the comments made at the recent Loyola
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At the beginning of September 2012, there were five active matters
designated as a “mass tort” or assigned for centralized management in
Bergen County, New Jersey: In re NuvaRing Litigation; 10 In re
YAZ/Yasmin/Ocella Litigation; 11 In re Prudential Life Insurance Co. of
America Tort Litigation; 12 In re Alleged Environmental Contamination
of Pompton Lakes; 13 and In re DePuy ASR Hip Implant Litigation.14
Combined with Atlantic and Middlesex Counties, 15 there are currently
twenty such cases pending in New Jersey. 16 In contrast, there are more
than 58,000 cases pending that have been consolidated as part of MDLs
in the federal court system. 17
There are, among others, two notable distinctions between the
handling of complex litigation in the federal and New Jersey court
systems. The first deals with the designation process itself; i.e., how the
parties (or court) apply for mass tort status, the factors a court must

University Chicago Law Journal Symposium, The Future of Class Actions and Its Alternatives.
10. Docket No. BER-L-3081-09 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.) (alleging that the plaintiffs suffered
damages from use of the NuvaRing® contraceptive ring, including death, tissue and organ
breakdown that occasionally necessitated amputation, heart attacks, and ischemic strokes). At of
the beginning of September 2012, there had been four cases filed in New Jersey alleging that
women died due to deep vein thrombosis (DVT) resulting from their use of NuvaRing®: Estate of
Bozicev v. Organon USA, BER-L-2869-09; Estate of Ramsey v. Organan USA, BER-L-2879-09;
Cox v. Organon USA, BER-L-2877-09; and Huff v. Organan USA, BER-L-7670-09.
11. Docket No. BER-L-3572-10 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.) (alleging damages arising from the
use of the oral contraceptives Yaz, Yasmin, and the generic drug Ocella).
12. Docket No. BER-L-2251-10 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.) (alleging commercial bribery and
other torts against Prudential Life Insurance Company of America brought by former employees).
13. Docket No. BER-L-10803-10 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.) (seeking damages for
environmental contamination allegedly caused by the defendant corporations brought by current
and former residents of Pompton Lakes, Passaic County, New Jersey).
14. Docket No. BER-L-3971-11 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.) (alleging damages and injuries
caused by ASRT hip implants where, after five years, thirteen percent of patients who received
the ASRT hip implants needed to have a second hip replacement surgery (revision surgery)).
15. Hon. Carol E. Higbee, P.J.Cv., sits in Atlantic County, and Hon. Jessica R. Mayer, J.S.C.,
sits in Middlesex County.
16. Currently, there are twelve cases designated as a “mass tort,” and eight cases designated
for “centralized management.” Many, but not all, of these cases involve pharmaceuticals or
medical devices. For further information on all prior and pending mass torts in New Jersey, see
Multicounty Litigation Center, NEW JERSEY COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/masstort/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). Prior cases in Bergen County include: In re Diet Drug
& Fen Phen Litigations, Docket Nos. BER-L-13379-04 and BER-L-7589-05 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law
Div.); In re Long Branch Manufactured Gas Plant Litigation, Docket No. BER-L-8839-04 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Law Div.); In re Depo-Provera Litigation, Docket No. BER-L-4889-07 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Law Div.); In re Alleged Mahwah Toxic Dump Site, Docket No. BER-L-489-08 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Law Div.); In re Zelnorm Litigation, Docket No. BER-L-7590-08 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.); and
In re Digitek Litigation, Docket No. BER-L-917-09 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.).
17. There are frequently matters pending in the MDL and several state courts. This raises a
myriad of issues, most notably the level of cooperation by and among federal and state courts.
See infra Part I (discussing the standard for mandamus review).
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consider when evaluating such an application, and the manner in which
a court’s determination may be appealed. The second addresses the
manner in which these cases are managed and tried in each respective
court system.
I. MASS TORT DESIGNATION AND APPEALS PROCESSES IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1407
govern the class action and mass tort application processes in the federal
courts, respectively. Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class
actions, each with its own specific requirements. 18 All class action
suits, however, must satisfy the following prerequisites: (1) “the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable” (numerosity);
(2) “questions of law or fact common to the class” (commonality); (3)
“the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class” (typicality); and (4) “the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”
(representativeness). 19
However, in the wake of Dukes, judges, practitioners, and academics
alike can agree that class certification has become increasingly difficult
for plaintiffs to obtain. 20 Plaintiffs must show “significant proof” to
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3) (listing the three circumstances under which a class
action may be maintained).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).
20. In Dukes, the Court held that, under Rule 23, a class action case alleging intentional
employment discrimination could not proceed when individual supervisors at different stores
made the allegedly discriminatory decisions. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2556–57 (2011). The majority opinion in Dukes increased the difficulty of proving a common
question of law or fact under Rule 23(a) by requiring “significant proof” to which the trial court
must extend a “rigorous analysis.” Id. at 2551–53. Although the Court did not provide much
detail as to what a “significant proof” standard should entail, by rejecting plaintiffs’ proof, the
Court seemed to indicate that the standard essentially requires a determination of the merits at the
time of class certification, and demands a higher level of specificity and expert and scientific
evidence than previously required. Id. See also Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
160–61 (1982) (finding that “sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the
pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,” and that certification is proper only
if “the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied”). In so doing, the Court suggested that the Daubert standard for introduction of
scientific proof at trial would also apply at the class certification stage. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at
2551–53. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584–89 (requiring the
trial judge, faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, to make a “preliminary assessment
of whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and
properly can be applied to the facts at issue,” and providing a non-exhaustive list of factors to be
considered, including whether the theory or technique in question can be tested, whether it has
been subjected to peer review and publication, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance
within a relevant scientific community). The standard essentially requires the proponent to
demonstrate that an expert’s conclusions are the product of sound scientific methodology, and not
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satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification. 21 Now, the
burden is placed on an individual district judge to conduct a rigorous
analysis, at times overlapping with the merits of the plaintiffs’
underlying claims, to determine whether to grant class certification.22
This has become a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs—judges are applying
Dukes’s “significant proof” and “rigorous analysis” standards to deny
class certification at the district court level. 23
Dukes results in an interesting dichotomy. Aggrieved litigants may
attempt to utilize the MDL process more readily to circumvent the
rigorous analysis a district court judge must undertake following the
Dukes decision. Unlike the “significant proof” standard required for
class certification, the MDL process, which is governed by 28 U.S.C. §
1407, is overseen by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(“JPML”). 24 The JPML is not required to undertake a rigorous analysis.
Instead, the panel relies on its experience—to which a reviewing court
affords extreme deference—to determine the appropriateness of
consolidating or transferring a case to a federal MDL. 25 Unlike the
requirements for class certification, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 provides: “When
civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” 26 The
merely based on a scientific technique that has been “generally accepted,” as was previously
required. Id. Accord FED. R. EVID. 702 (adopting the Daubert standard for expert testimony
admissibility).
21. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551–53. Similarly, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court
held that, because there is no inherent right to try a case as a class action, arbitration clauses that
waived the right to prosecute a class action were not per se unconscionable, thus making it easier
for defendants to opt out of class-wide arbitration clauses in contracts. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–52
(2011). See also NAACP v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 791 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2011) (discussing the rationale of the Court in Concepcion which allowed defendants to more
easily opt out of contractual class-wide arbitration clauses).
22. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (Rule 23 “certification is proper only if ‘the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied’ . . . .”)
(citations omitted) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160).
23. See, e.g., Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73938, at *16–17 (N.D.
Cal. July 7, 2011) (decertifying a class in light of Dukes’s “forceful affirmation of a class action
plaintiff’s obligation to produce common proof of class-wide liability in order to justify class
certification”). See also Daniel Leonard, Jocelyn Larkin, Paul Smith & Hon. Emmet Sullivan,
ABA Section of Litigation 2012, Putting Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes to the Test: Can This Class
Be Certified? (2012) (listing Post-Dukes Rule 23 certification cases and their outcomes as of
February 2012).
24. The JPML consists of seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the
Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit. 28 U.S.C. §
1407(d) (2006). The concurrence of four members is necessary for any action by the panel. Id.
25. See, e.g., FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., v. U.S. JPML, 662 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir.
2011).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Each action so transferred is remanded by the panel at or before the

9_MARTINOTTI.DOCX

566

12/14/2012 4:36 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

JPML’s determination as to whether to transfer actions is based on the
convenience of parties and witnesses, and is made in an effort to
promote just and efficient conduct of such actions. It seems clear that
rigorous analysis standard for class certification under Rule 23 is much
higher than the largely discretionary standard employed by the JPML.
The processes for appealing a court’s class certification order or
transfer for consolidation or coordinated proceedings varies greatly by
jurisdiction and type of relief sought. Rule 23(f), which governs an
appeal of a district court’s decision of whether to grant class
certification, 27 was adopted to expand the discretion of Courts of
Appeals to grant interlocutory review of class certification rulings. The
Rule was intended to be broad in scope and vested “[t]he courts of
appeals [with] develop[ing] standards for granting review that reflects
the changing areas of uncertainty in class litigation.” 28
Relying on the Advisory Committee’s Notes, the Seventh Circuit first
held that interlocutory review is appropriate when the denial of class
certification sounds the “death knell” for plaintiffs whose “claim is too
small to justify the expense of litigation,” or defendants facing claims
where “the stakes are large and the risk of a settlement or other
disposition that does not reflect the merits of the claim is substantial.” 29
The Seventh Circuit further held that interlocutory review is proper
when an appeal involves a “fundamental issue” relating to class
actions. 30 Both the First and the Second Circuits have largely adopted
the Seventh Circuit’s approach. 31 The Third, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits have expanded upon the approach, adopting “manifest error” in
the class certification ruling as an independent and adequate ground for
interlocutory review thereof. 32 The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall
have been previously terminated.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or
denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed . . .
within 14 days . . . . An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless . . . so
order[ed].”).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (1998) (noting the Courts of Appeals have
“unfettered discretion . . . akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a
petition for certiorari”).
29. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1999).
30. Id. at 835.
31. Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001)
(adopting the Seventh Circuit approach without modification); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v.
Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that Rule 23(f) review is appropriate in
cases involving a fundamental issue only if it is “important to the particular litigation as well as
important in itself and likely to escape effective review if left hanging until the end of the case”).
32. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir.
2001); Chamberlain v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); Vallario v. Vandehey,
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have adopted a “five factor sliding scale” test in deciding whether to
grant review. 33 Under this test, the courts of appeal uses a “sliding
scale” to determine whether the district court erred in deciding to grant
or deny review. 34 Rule 23(f) is still evolving, varies by circuit, and has
resulted in a relatively small number of interlocutory appeals. 35
With respect to the appeal of the JPML’s determinations, on the other
hand, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 makes clear that “[t]here shall be no appeal or
review of an order of the panel denying a motion to transfer for
consolidated or coordinated proceedings.” 36 The statute further requires
that appeals of JPML orders be brought in the circuit court with
jurisdiction over the case or transferee court. 37 This is a high standard
for relief. To qualify for mandamus relief, a party must show that it has
no other means to obtain relief. 38 Litigants often satisfy this first
requirement because “[n]o proceedings for review of any order of the
[JPML] may be permitted except by extraordinary writ.” 39 Next, a
litigant must show that his or her right to the writ is clear and
indisputable and a reviewing court must be satisfied that the writ is
appropriate under the circumstances. 40 Moreover, “only exceptional
circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear
abuse of discretion will justify the invocation of this extraordinary
remedy.” 41 The Seventh Circuit has been observed that
a transferee district court knows well the issues and dynamics of [a]
particular case. The JPML brings to bear decades of experience with
more than a thousand MDL proceedings, which have included some of
554 F.3d 1259, 1263–64 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289
F.3d 98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
33. See Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 144–46 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Delta Air
Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002); Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274–76 (11th
Cir. 2000).
34. See Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1275 n.10 (“The stronger the showing of an abuse of
discretion, the more this factor weighs in favor of interlocutory review.”); Lienhart, 225 F.3d at
145–46; In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d at 960. These courts also consider the status of the
litigation in the district court, particularly the progress of discovery.
35. See Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion
in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 290 (2008) (providing circuit-by-circuit data on the
number of petitions filed and the percentage of those petitions granted).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
37. See, e.g., Order, In re Shannon McConnell (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012) (No. 11-4265) (denying
appeal of the JPML’s transfer of products liability case from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio for consolidated pretrial proceedings in In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2010)).
38. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
40. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381.
41. Id. at 380 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
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the most complex and challenging cases in the history of the federal
courts. The choice between . . . methods of case management is an
archetype for a discretionary judgment, and the transferee court and
the JPML are in the best position to make that judgment. In terms of
the standards for issuing writs of mandamus, it would be rare for one
party to have a “clear and indisputable right” to one method over the
other. 42

In general, a reviewing court will defer to the JPML’s exercise of its
discretion, which gives rise to the imprimatur of reasonableness as the
panel’s decisions are essentially presumed valid and reasonable. 43 This
deference presents a difficult hurdle for appellants seeking to challenge
transfer or consolidation. 44 It seems likely, then, that there will be a
trend toward mass torts and MDLs (or centrally managed litigations) as
opposed to class actions, which have become increasingly difficult to
obtain. 45
In New Jersey, on the other hand, the multicounty litigation (MCL)

42. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. v. U.S. JPML, 662 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 2011).
43. See, e.g., id. (“The choice between . . . methods of case management is an archetype for a
discretionary judgment, and the transferee court and the JPML are in the best position to make
that judgment.”). Because “the fact-specific nature of MDL litigation call[s] for leaving such
case-management decisions to the sound discretion of the transferee court and the JPML,” id.,
litigants challenging the JPML’s exercise of discretion rarely meet the standard for mandamus
relief.
44. See Order, In re Shannon McConnell (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012) (No. 11-4265) (denying
party’s appeal of JPML’s transfer of products liability actions).
45. Whether there is class certification, mass tort litigation is complex litigation in which the
judge must define problems and actively shape the litigation. Indeed, in 2002, the Judicial
Conference changed class action rules to give the judge greater ability to shape class actions,
including more influence over the selection of lawyers to represent the class and greater control
over lawyers’ fees. See Letter from David F. Levi, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil
Procedure, to Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(May 20, 2002) (describing amendments); Linda Greenhouse, Judges Back Rule Changes for
Handling Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at A18. There may be hundreds of
thousands of plaintiffs, multiple defendants, and numerous lawyers to be responsible during
discovery (or at least to back up the magistrate judge). Third, fourth, and fifth parties such as
insurance companies and governments may be involved.
The judge and/or magistrate judge must decide hundreds of procedural and evidentiary motions.
The judge must decide whether to certify a class, determine subclasses, and decide how to deal
with future mass tort claimants. He must grapple with complex issues of jurisdiction, choice of
law, preemption, statutes of limitations, and burdens of proof. He must attempt to understand and
try to help the jurors understand scientific evidence and separate “good science” from “junk
science,” coordinate with state (or federal) judges, appoint settlement (and special) masters,
decide whether a settlement is fair, determine proper attorneys’ fees, and hold “fairness hearings.”
JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK
WEINSTEIN 319 (2011). See also Joseph M. Price & Ellen S. Rosenberg, The Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Controversy: The Rise of Expert Panels and the Fall of Junk Science, 93 J. ROYAL SOC’Y
MED. 31, 33 (2000) (advocating for “a vigorous enforcement of the Daubert standards and the
requirements of sound science by the courts” through the use of expert science panels).
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application and designation process is governed by Rule 4:38A46 of the
Rules Governing Civil Practice in the Superior Court, Tax Court, and
Surrogate’s Courts. 47 The Rule provides:
The Supreme Court may designate a case or category of cases as a
mass tort to receive centralized management in accordance with
criteria and procedures promulgated by the administrative Director of
the Courts upon approval by the Court. Promulgation of the criteria
and procedures will include posting in the Mass Tort Information
Center on the Judiciary’s Internet website (www.judiciary.
state.nj.us). 48

The guidelines issued in conjunction with Rule 4:38A set forth a
procedure for requesting mass tort designation. 49 The process permits
an attorney involved in the case (most often plaintiffs’ attorneys) or the
assignment judge of any vicinage to apply to the New Jersey Supreme
Court to have a group of factually and legally similar cases classified as
a mass tort and assigned a designated judge for centralized
management. Upon receipt of such an application, the Administrative
Office of the Courts (“AOC”) publishes a notice about the case to all
parties involved, to the bar in legal newspapers, and on the Judiciary’s
website. Following publication, the AOC accepts comments and
objections to the application for a defined time period before deciding
whether to grant or deny the application.
In reviewing an application for mass tort designation or centralized
46. All subsequent textual references to New Jersey “Rules” are to the Rules Governing Civil
Practice in the Superior Court, Tax Court, and Surrogate’s Courts.
47. Prior to 2003, there had been much comment and discussion surrounding how courts in
New Jersey should handle mass tort claims. See Michael Dore, Reforming the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s Procedures for Consolidating Mass Tort Litigation: A Proposal for Disclosing
the Rules of the Game, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 591 (2002) (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme
Court for lack of transparency and predictability in consolidation proceedings). Mass tort
coordination efforts began with the Supreme Court’s consolidation of all Johns-Manville asbestos
matters for case management by Hon. John E. Keefe in Middlesex County. Mass Tort Advisory
Committee Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court, 154 N.J. L.J. 528, 528 (Nov. 9, 1998).
Following the asbestos consolidation order, the Supreme Court centralized other significant
litigations in Middlesex County, but failed to disclose the procedures that had been used to decide
the coordinated treatment of these cases. The successful handling of these matters led to a
proposal of a blue ribbon committee for the formation of a single mass tort court in Middlesex
County. Id. Although the Mass Tort Advisory Report was widely praised, the Supreme Court
rejected its proposals. Supreme Court of New Jersey Administrative Determinations Report of the
Mass Tort Advisory Committee, 157 N.J. L.J. 696, 696 (Aug. 16, 1999). This prompted the
Court, in October 2003, to formally promulgate Rule 4:38A to provide for the centralized
management of mass torts in New Jersey. Michael Dore, The New Jersey Mass Tort Designation
Process: Who Decides What Kind of Cases Go Where?, N.J. LAW., Aug. 2011, at 12.
48. N.J. CT. R. 4:38A.
49. See N.J. COURTS, MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION GUIDELINES, DIRECTIVE #08-12, available
at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2012/n120809b.pdf (discussing the procedure for
requesting mass tort designation pursuant to Rule 4:38A).
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management, the court must consider whether: (1) the case involves a
large numbers of parties; (2) the case involves numerous claims with
common, recurrent issues of law and fact that are related to a consumer
product, mass disaster, or environmental or toxic tort; (3) the parties to
the litigation are geographically disbursed; (4) there is a high degree of
commonality among the plaintiffs’ injuries or damages; and (5) there is
a “value interdependence” between different claims (i.e., the strength or
weakness of the causation and liability aspects of the case are often
“dependent upon the success or failure of similar lawsuits in other
jurisdictions”). 50
II. MASS TORT CASE MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
A. Case Management Conference and Order
Once the AOC determines a case is appropriate for mass tort status or
centralized management, the New Jersey Supreme Court issues an order
memorializing the same. The mass tort judge assigned to preside over
the case will then set up the initial Case Management Conference
(“CMC”) and issue an initial Case Management Order (“CMO”).
An important distinction between federal MDLs and New Jersey
MCLs is the court in which those cases are actually tried. In the federal
system, the MDL court must remand the case to its original jurisdiction
following the completion of pretrial proceedings. 51 In New Jersey,
50. See id. There are, of course, other factors to be considered, including, but not limited to:
[The] degree of remoteness between the court and actual decision-makers in the
litigation[;] . . . whether there is a risk that centralization may unreasonably delay the
progress, increase the expense, or complicate the processing of any action, or otherwise
prejudice a party; whether centralized management is fair and convenient to the parties,
witnesses and counsel; whether there is a risk of duplicative and inconsistent rulings,
orders or judgments if the cases are not managed in a coordinated fashion; whether
coordinated discovery would be advantageous; whether the cases require specialized
expertise and case processing as provided by the dedicated multicounty litigation judge
and staff; whether centralization would result in the efficient utilization of judicial
resources[;] . . . [and] whether there are related matters pending in Federal court or in
other state courts that require coordination with a single New Jersey judge.
Id.
Independent of these guidelines, in July 2005, the New Jersey Judiciary published a Mass Tort
Resource Book (“Resource Book”) to address issues that arise in mass tort litigation from the
case’s designation through resolution. NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, NEW JERSEY MASS TORT (NONASBESTOS) RESOURCE BOOK (3d ed. 2007), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/masstort/MassTortSOP_NonAsbestosNovember2007WebVersion.pdf. The Resource Book explains
to practitioners how mass tort coordination decisions are made, how these cases are administered,
and the process the Court will use to send these cases to one of the three mass tort venues in the
State. See id. at 2–5.
51. FED. R. P. J.P.M.L. 7.6.
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MCL cases are tried in the county in which those cases have been
transferred or consolidated. 52 As a result, for the state trial judge, venue
rules are superseded by the court’s consolidation order. Therefore, a
litigant will have her pretrial managed and tried by the same judge and
trial before a jury from a county that would not otherwise have proper
venue pursuant to Rule 4:3-2 or 4:3-3. 53
Once a case has been designated a mass tort or assigned for
centralized management, a trial or managing judge will issue a
comprehensive CMO. 54 This initial order sets forth the “ground rules”
for the litigation, including the court’s expectations and requirements of
the parties and their legal counsel. 55 Furthermore, the initial CMO
provides a framework for the litigation. Future CMOs may be divided
into subparts; e.g., “compliance with prior orders,” “case management,”
and “substantive motions.” As the litigation progresses, subsequent
CMOs detail the flow of the litigation. The initial order will also
schedule the first CMC. At that conference, liaison counsel may be
selected. Liaison counsel is similar to a steering committee and serves
as a filter/representative for all counsel when addressing the court.
As these complex cases often remain pending in other courts for
some time prior to the transfer or consolidation order, it is beneficial for
the trial or managing judge to keep in frequent contact with counsel,
52. To illustrate by example: Suppose a New Jersey plaintiff files a case in Morris County,
New Jersey, and that case is later assigned to Atlantic County for centralized management. The
case will be tried in Atlantic County. However, if the same plaintiff files her claim in the Federal
District Court for New Jersey, and that case is consolidated under a federal MDL in the Sixth
Circuit, the case would be managed by the MDL judge for pretrial proceedings, but would be
remanded to the District of New Jersey for trial. There are, however, techniques to overcome this
requirement.
53. N.J. CT. R. 4:3-2(a) (providing that venue “shall be laid in the county in which the cause
of action arose, or in which any party to the action resides at the time of its commencement, or in
which the summons was served on a nonresident defendant . . .”). See also N.J. CT. R. 4:3-3(a)
(noting that “a change of venue may be ordered by the Assignment Judge or the designee of the
Assignment Judge of the county in which venue is laid . . . (1) if the venue is not laid in
accordance with R. 4:3-2; or (2) if there is a substantial doubt that a fair and impartial trial can be
had in the county where venue is laid; or (3) for the convenience of the parties and witnesses in
the interest of justice”). Thus, when a group of similar cases become consolidated as part of a
multicounty litigation, it may lead to a trial in a county that does not provide the ideal jury pool
for individual plaintiffs or defendants.
54. See, e.g., Initial Order for Case Management, In re Yaz, Yasmin, Ocella Litigation (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2010) (No. 287), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/masstort/yaz/yaz_init_cmo.pdf. Given the unique factual and legal issues presented, judges can be
creative when crafting orders and have much discretion and flexibility in their management of
these cases. Frequently, they are in uncharted waters and there is little or no precedent when
confronted with issues.
55. In the initial CMO, or any subsequent CMO, a court may require the use of a particular
plaintiff/defendant fact sheet or short form complaint/answer to enable a judge to quickly review
a particular plaintiff’s or defendant’s underlying cause of action and/or defenses.
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either through regularly held (often monthly) in-person CMCs,
telephonic status conferences, or e-mail status updates. This practice
allows a mass tort trial judge to keep his or her finger on the pulse of the
litigation, which, in turn, will help to avoid voluminous motion practice
and permit an expeditious flow of the litigation. 56
B. Case Management Techniques
There are a number of case management techniques that a mass tort
judge might employ at various stages of the litigation with the goal of
streamlining the process for the parties and the court. Among these
tools are Lone Pine orders, Stempler interviews, appointment of special
masters, use of bellwether trials, and state and federal judge
cooperation.
Lone Pine orders refer generically to a case management order that
requires plaintiffs in potentially large or complex cases to define their
alleged injuries and/or damages and demonstrate at the outset some
minimal level of evidentiary support for key components of their
claims, usually causation of damages. 57 The traditional rationale for
such orders is that they seek to ensure that completely unsupported
claims will not consume the judge’s or litigants’ resources. 58 Thus,
Lone Pine orders typically require plaintiffs to provide case-specific
expert reports establishing a basis for their claims—i.e., that their
injuries were caused by the defendant’s conduct—and the scientific
basis for the experts’ opinions. 59 Although Lone Pine orders are
relatively rare in New Jersey mass tort jurisprudence, they have been

56. Of course, there are a myriad of complex substantive and procedural motions that are
filed in mass tort litigations, including jurisdictional and preemption arguments, Daubert/Kemp
motions (as to expert testimony and underlying science), and privilege. Because of the unique
factual and legal issues involved in mass torts and MDLs, judges are afforded great latitude and
deference in the handling of such matters. This includes the use of creative case management and
scheduling orders that otherwise may not be sanctioned. For example, a judge may require
counsel to seek and receive permission of the Court prior to filing any substantive motions.
57. Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L 33606-85, 1986 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1626 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986).
58. Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-227, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6601, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 30, 2007) (“The basic purpose of a Lone Pine order is to identify and cull potentially
meritless claims and streamline litigation in complex cases involving numerous claimants.”).
59. The critical point to remember with Lone Pine orders is that whatever perceived burdens
they place on the plaintiffs must be weighed against the burdens protracted litigation will impose
on the court system and the defendant. They do not, as plaintiffs often argue, unfairly require the
plaintiffs to prove their case before proceeding with the lawsuit. They merely require plaintiffs to
define their claims clearly and to demonstrate that there is some competent evidentiary support to
justify proceeding with time consuming, burdensome, and complex litigation. MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 10.1–11.33 (2004).
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successfully employed in complex cases in many other states. 60
Stempler interviews are informal ex parte conferences with a nonparty treating physician, on notice to the plaintiff-patient. 61 It is
essentially “cheap” discovery (as opposed to a deposition on the
record). When a plaintiff unreasonably withholds an authorization for
the interview of a non-party treating physician, production of such
authorization “can be compelled . . . by motion.” 62 In Stempler v.
Speidel, the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth the following
conditions for defense counsel’s ex parte contact with a physician when
the Court orders such contact in response to a motion to compel: (1)
provide the treating physician with a description of the anticipated
scope of the interview; (2) communicate with “unmistakable clarity”
that the physician’s participation in the ex parte interview is voluntary;
and (3) provide plaintiff’s counsel with reasonable notice of the time
and place of the proposed interview. 63
As issues arise, usually at the monthly CMCs, the court will order
counsel to “meet and confer” about the issues. Of course, it is expected
that counsel would discuss issues with each other prior to seeking court
intervention. Remarkably, however, it is often not until they are
ordered to engage each other that the parties resolve (or substantially
resolve) these issues amongst themselves. Perhaps a reason for that
success is, as disputed issues are discussed at CMCs, counsel can get a
feeling as to how a judge may rule on the disputed issue(s) that may
temper their positions with opposing counsel. Thus, the meet and
confer session may be more successful than it would have been without
the court’s “musings.”
The special master’s role in complex litigation is to supervise those
falling under the order of the court to ensure that court orders are
followed, and to report to the judge on the activities of the entity being
supervised. Often, but not exclusively, these roles arise in MDL cases,
class actions, or other complex or multiparty litigation. Special masters
60. See, e.g., M. Bernadette Welch, Propriety and Application of Lone Pine Orders Used to
Expedite Claims and Increase Judicial Efficiency in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 A.L.R. 6th 383, 392
(2010) (“In recent years, both federal and state courts have begun using Lone Pine orders during
the prediscovery phase in cases involving mass tort claims as a means of streamlining case
management and promoting efficient case resolution. Lone Pine orders generally require
plaintiffs to identify their injuries with specificity and produce some evidence of causation,
enabling courts to focus their attention on scientific and technical issues at the beginning of a case
instead of having to wait for the actual trial.”).
61. Stempler v. Speidel, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985). See also In re Pelvic Mesh/Gynecare
Litig., 43 A.3d 1211, 1220–21 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2012) (discussing the considerations and
holding of the Stempler court).
62. Stempler, 495 A.2d at 864.
63. Id.
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take on several types of roles, including: settlement master; discovery
master; coordinating master; trial master; expert advisor; technology
master; claims administrator; receiver; criminal case master; conference
judge; and appellate master. 64 Each of these special masters serves a
discrete function and aids the court, in particular, with discovery
disputes and settlements. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
procedure governs the appointment of masters in federal courts. 65 In
New Jersey, the state court rules require the approval by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to appoint masters in mass torts. 66
As discovery draws to a close, bellwether trials become another
important case management tool often used in mass tort and MDL
cases. 67 The court schedules the selection of bellwether trials, which
are essentially trials to indicate future trends in a specific litigation. The
trial selection process varies. 68 Some courts choose a random sample of
cases to try to a jury, others require counsel to submit a list of cases to
choose from, while others leave the selection of trial cases to counsel.
The judge may then bifurcate the cases into liability and damages
phases, or perhaps even trifurcate them into liability, causation, and
damages phases. The parties try each bellwether case before a jury that
renders a verdict in that particular case. Finally, the results of the
bellwether trials are extrapolated to the remaining plaintiffs. The
underlying principle of such an extrapolation is that the bellwether
plaintiffs are typical of the rest of the plaintiff group such that the
results of the bellwether trials represent the likely outcome of their
cases. 69 This information is intended to help facilitate settlement by
providing counsel insight as to the true value of the claims involved.
There are times, however, that a bellwether trial will not help advance
64. See ACADEMY OF COURT-APPOINTED MASTERS, APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTERS AND
OTHER JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS (2d ed. 2009) (describing the various types of special masters and
their use in complex litigations).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (outlining the appointment process, scope of authority, and
compensation of special masters in federal courts).
66. N.J. CT. R. 4:41. For a discussion of the role of special masters in a non-mass tort setting,
see Zehl v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 43 A.3d 1188, 1193–96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
67. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1248 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999) (describing
the history of bellwether trials and their use in the mass tort context).
68. Frequently, the court will have a spreadsheet comparing and grouping plaintiffs by various
categories—for example, injuries claimed and location of damage. This allows a quick and easy
search for commonality and is a tool utilized for the selection of bellwether trials.
69. Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 581 (2007) (citing
Richard O. Faulk, Robert E. Meadows & Kevin L. Colbert, Building a Better Mousetrap? A New
Approach to Trying Mass Tort Cases, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 779, 791–92 (1998)). See
Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 556
(2012) (discussing equality under the law as a due process element grounded in the notion of
“like cases ought to be treated alike”).
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settlement. For example, if the parties and counsel are in the midst of
successful settlement discussions, a bellwether trial that results in a
verdict outside the range of settlement—i.e., an outlier—may empower
a party to go forth with the litigation and cause negotiations to break
down.
Lastly, although not a case management technique per se, state and
federal court judges must seek to cooperate with one another where
there are related cases pending in federal MDLs and state courts. 70 As
mass torts in New Jersey often have related matters pending in federal
courts (in the form of MDLs or individual plaintiffs who have removed
their case to federal court), one of the most important functions for a
mass tort judge in state court is coordinating with federal courts. It is
imperative for judges in state and federal courts to keep in close contact
and stay abreast of developments in their respective cases. 71 This
mutual relationship can be accomplished through formal procedures
(e.g., CMCs), informal status updates from liaison counsel, or from
federal judges themselves. Doing so helps ensure consistent results
across the inventory of cases, avoids duplicative litigation, and allows
for more efficient handling of matters in all court systems.
CONCLUSION
Since 2003, following the New Jersey Supreme Court’s promulgation
of Rule 4:38A, New Jersey’s mass tort designation process has become
more transparent, allowing for more orderly and predictable handling of
these cases in state courts. However, following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions in Dukes and Concepcion, there has been much
speculation and discussion about the future of, and alternatives to, class
70. See NEW JERSEY MASS TORT (NON-ASBESTOS) RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 50
(advising that, at the outset of the litigation, the mass tort judge should craft a litigation plan,
taking into consideration the nature of the litigation, the number of similar cases outside the
court’s jurisdiction, and whether a multidistrict case is pending in the federal courts). See also
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 13.1–13.21 (2009) (endorsing the use of
coordinated state-federal proceedings wherever possible).
71. See, e.g., Case Management Order No. 28 at 2, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone)
Marketing, Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig. (E.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2011) (MDL No. 2100 3:09md-02100-DRH-PMF) (adopting deposition protocol to be used in all MDL and state court cases;
coordinating with state court judges to enter identical deposition protocol orders in California,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; and specifically noting that “[d]isputes relating to depositions
shall be resolved jointly by the Courts, wherever possible”); In re DePuy ASR™ Hip Implants,
No. BER-L-3971-11, slip op. at 3–5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2011) (adopting joint state-MDL
document production protocol). But see In re NuvaRing Litig., Docket No. BER-L-3081-09 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Law Div.) (issuing an order and decision on October 22, 2012, denying defendants’
request to keep certain document under seal, following the MDL’s order on September 5, 2012,
granting in part defendants’ motion for same; the MDL has since unsealed the documents at issue,
consistent with the MCL order).
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actions and complex litigation. 72 Similar discussions have arisen
following the New Jersey Appellate Division decision in NAACP v.
Foulke Management. 73
With the recently tightened class action certification standards
imposed on plaintiffs by the Supreme Court, and defendants’ ability to
opt out of class-wide arbitration and litigation clauses, jurists are likely
to see a greater number of alternatives to traditional class action
lawsuits, in the form of MDL/mass tort applications, motions for
consolidation pursuant to Rule 4:38, or the consolidation of a small
number of related cases within the same jurisdiction before a single
judge. 74 No matter the form, however, aggregate and complex litigation
will always remain an important procedural device in civil litigation.

72. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: WalMart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 73, 97
(2011) (“The practical effect of these rulings is to protect corporations from class actions in both
the employment and consumer contexts.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future
Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 52 (2011) (opining that
“Dukes has redefined the class certification requirements for Title VII cases in ways that
jeopardize potentially meritorious challenges to systematic employment discrimination” and
noting that “it is clear that Dukes has tipped the balance in favor of powerful employers over
everyday workers”); Julie Slater, Reaping the Benefits of Class Certification: How and When
Should “Significant Proof” Be Required Post-Dukes?, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1259, 1291
(advocating for greater clarity of the “significant proof” standard and for its application “to other
types of cases outside the employment discrimination context that, like Dukes, involve complex
claims and a diverse class”).
73. 24 A.3d 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). In Foulke, the Appellate Division upheld
the trial court’s specific ruling that the class action waiver provisions in the contract documents
should not be invalidated on public policy grounds, a conclusion that is consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion.
74. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Asseenontv.com, Inc., 962 A.2d 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009); Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 963 A.2d 849 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (having
filed 71 class action lawsuits in Bergen County over an 18-month period, the plaintiff alleged a
violation of the Consumer Fraud Act; these lawsuits were never formally consolidated, however,
but were assigned to one judge for pre-trial case management by directive of the Assignment
Judge). For further information on the Hoffman cases, see Henry Gottlieb, Charles Toutant &
Michael Booth, Hoffman Unchained, N.J. L.J. (Jan. 30, 2009); Charles Toutant, Frequent Flier’s
Claim of False Advertising on Internet Dismissed, N.J. L.J. (Jan. 12, 2009).

